Paper

The Obstacles of Remote Control

In Brian O’Shaughnessy’s The Will, a project is undertaken in which the author attempts to understand the meaning of the sentence “I can/cannot will the movement of extra-bodily objects.” In order to understand the meaning of this, O’Shaughnessy worked to find an example of what it would be to exert one’s will on an extra-bodily item. He began with a technical means example in which one turned a knob that increased the volume of a wireless. However, he wanted to find an example in which one eliminated the use of technical means. In order to do so he discussed a series of cases each of which was closer to his goal of a good example of an extra-bodily willing. He did this by first considering cases of remote control, but ran into three major difficulties. The difficulties as he states them are “that the uses of ‘know’ could not be made to tally with those operative in cases of physical action; that the putatively willed extra-bodily physical phenomenon needed to be triggered off by a distinct internal act; and that it occurred in an object that the subject could not ‘feel’” (106). This paper will work to explain these difficulties in a simple, comprehensive manner.
Now that we have the setting for the obstacles, we can begin to find their true meaning. The first obstacle O’Shaughnessy encountered was that “the uses of ‘know’ could not be made to tally with those operative in cases of physical action” (106). This first difficulty addresses the uses of “know” in his examples in comparison to the normal use in physical action. The main case in which this becomes an issue is case γ. The case describes an agent that says “move” to an object and knows that it will move. He does this successfully, and when asked how he knows he simply says that he just knows. Similarly in normal physical action when one is asked to move their arm assuming it is not paralyzed he is able to say it will move and know that it will. Further, when asked how he knows he usually will say that he just knows.
This is the closest case to physical action that O’Shaughnessy could find; however, it still is not the same use of the word “know” when asked how the agent knows. This can be seen as O’Shaughnessy breaks down the types of knowing there are into categories consisting of transparency, opaqueness, explicable, and inexplicable. The type of knowing in normal physical action is that of explicable opaqueness, while that of case γ is that of inexplicable opaqueness. To say that knowledge is opaque is to say that when one is asked how he knows his arm or the object will move, he just knows, and it is a mystery how, which is the case for both case γ and normal physical action. However, with physical action it is explicable knowing because it can be explained how the arm moves. However, with case γ it is inexplicable because it cannot be explained how the object moved. Thus while in both case γ and in normal physical action the agent is said to just know that the movement will occur, the types of know diverge on the ability to be explained. It is this distinction that is brought to light in O’Shaughnessy’s first obstacle.
The second difficulty faced is that “the putatively willed extra-bodily physical phenomenon needed to be triggered off by a distinct internal act” (106). What this is trying to bring to light is that in each of the presented cases the agent said “move” right before the movement of the object. To remove this issue another couple cases may be presented in which one simply addresses the word “move” in his mind and the object moves. However, this still faces the problem that the agent needs to do some sort of internal act before the object will move. In the case of physical action one does not have to really think about moving a limb for it move. This can be seen when one idly fidgets without even noticing it. In the true case of intention one does not need any sort of distinct internal act to trigger movement. However, all of the cases that were presented fall short of physical action in this way as they at the very least require the agent to bring the word “move” to mind for the object to move. This is the second obstacle in finding an example of willed extra-bodily movement.
The final obstacle that O’Shaughnessy encountered was that the extra-bodily movement “occurred in an object that the subject could not feel” (106). This difficulty faces the problem of feeling. In order to discuss this, we can start by considering a case in which one’s arm is brought to complete numbness. By complete numbness, it is meant that he cannot feel pain, heat, postural sensations, or anything at all. It is as if the arm is not there except that he can look down and see it is there. It would be strange to have this person pick up a pen and start writing. Without any sensation whatsoever it is impossible to expect the agent to have any use of the arm, or knowledge of how to go about moving it. With his eyes closed, he would not be able to even tell how his arm was lying. This shows how feeling is important in physical action. Without a feeling-based awareness of a given limb one could not go about moving it. Feeling in this way is directly connected to one’s power to move a limb. Without feeling, one lacks the power to move a limb. The third difficulty is that all of the examples used involved an extra-bodily object that the agent had no feeling in. Since we just discovered that without feeling, an agent lacks power to move a given limb, it follows that the agents in the examples would lack the power to move the extra-bodily object.
O’Shaughnessy set out to find an example of remote control that would satisfy the willing of an extra-bodily movement. However, this paper explained the three major problems that he encountered in his search for a good case. In the first obstacle different uses of the word know were discussed as no case was able to produce the normal use of the word know. Secondly, it was found that the cases all involved some sort of internal triggering act that is not present in physical action. Lastly, the extra-bodily willings described in the cases all involved the movement of an object that the agent could not feel. So much for remote control.

Chapter 3 Study Questions

1. What does O’Shaughnessy mean by “spiritualizing” bodily action? How, initially (i.e. section 1), does this present a problem?

When we spiritualize bodily action, we understand "willing" to be an entirely mental act that causes whatever physical action we do. In this way, we keep bodily action in the inner realm and completely split it off from the outward active phenomena. In this case one does not open a door, but instead internally wills their wrist to twist while grasping the knob in hopes that the knob will turn and the door open. When one tries to do x (turn) to y (knob), it is understood as "the performing of an act of will directed at y (knob) in the hope of producing x (turn). In this case all tryings consist of the "same kind of phenomena", the direct and internal act of the will.

This presents a problem in that there are multiple ways of defining "I can...". It is important to distinguish which form should be used when considering the willing of extra-bodily things. Furthermore, once the model is found, there is a problem in discovering how it is to be known whether or not one has the power to move extra-bodily objects (i.e. the sun). How does one go about trying and failing at doing this? When we spiritualize bodily action, actions are manifested in internal willings. However, we cannot even begin to internally attempt to will the movement of extra-bodily objects, and thus cannot conceive of whether or not this is possible.

2. Describe three distinct uses of “I cannot move my so-and-so” (where “so-and-so” is some bodily part) — along with paradigm occasions for the use of that expression in that way.

a) The first case is one in which there is an external force other than the given limb that is preventing movement of the limb. In this case the subject would be able to move his or her limb if it were not for the external barrier preventing the movement. For example, a man with a normally working leg has his leg trapped under a tree and is unable to move it. It is under the circumstances of his leg being trapped under a tree alone that causes his inability to move his leg.
b) The second case involves a subject that is recovering from a previously paralyzed limb. In this case it is not an external object but rather the internal motor mechanism of the limb that is preventing motion. Furthermore, in the first case the subject could push and pull at his leg in order to "try" to move his limb. However, in this case the subject can only simply say that he is trying without actually showing any outward signs of trying.
c) The third case is considered the instrumentalist case. Here when the subject is asked to raise his right arm, he uses his left arm to instrumentally lift his right arm. These acts are acts that are willed by instrumentally moving one's arm.

3. O’Shaughnessy claims: (IF θ1, THEN θ2) and NOT(IF θ2, THEN θ1).But he also accepts (IF(θ2 + ?), THEN θ1). What goes in the place of “?” to make a principle that O’Shaughnessy accepts?

θ1 claims that if liberty prevails then liberty does prevail and trying suffices, while θ2 claims just that if libery prevails then trying suffices. In other words θ1 states that given the circumstances that one is able to move his arm without external barriers and that there are no external barriers then one can move his arm. θ2 states the first half of θ1 by stating that if there are no external barriers one can move his arm. In this sense if θ1 is true, θ2 must be true as it is a necessary condition of θ1 being true. However, θ2 is only half the story of what it takes for θ1 to be true. If θ2 is true and it is also known that there is no current external barrier, then we can state θ1 is also true. Stated another way "IF (θ2 + ?), THEN θ1". Here the ? is that in the given situation there is no external barrier preventing θ2 from being acted out.

4. By your lights, what would be involved in trying to move the sun—just by willing it?

I don't understand here if the question is jokingly asking us what we would do in trying to will the sun to move or just seeking the answer that it is inconceivable what one would do in order to try and fail at willing the sun move. Thus, I must say that I am unsure what it would mean to try to will the sun to move. Mystics may concentrate very hard on the sun and mentally request of the sun movement. However, is that what it is to try to move the sun? This trying is unlike the trying of moving one's limb in the case of a tree trapping a leg. Trying in this case consists of pushing and pulling. Furthermore, in the case of a paralyzed limb it is even conceivable that one attempts to move the limb in the way they move other limbs. It is harder to conceive of, but it is understood in this case that one simply tries to move the limb. However, to say the same about the sun seems entirely different. We know nothing of what it means to will the sun to move and thus to try to seems inconceivable as well.

5. What’s the difference between instrumental trying and trying according to the “model use,” which makes the latter problematic?

Instrumental trying consists of performing an action instrumentally. For example, lifting one's arm by using the opposite arm to raise it. The model use involves directly willing the arm to raise. This becomes problematic when one is asked to wiggle their earlobe and after supposedly trying cannot do so. When we ask him how he went about trying he cannot really answer the question. However, when we ask someone to open a door through instrumental trying, he will simply turn the doorknob and open the door. When asked how he went about trying he can simply state what it took for him to complete the task. When one considers the willing of movements outside of the body one is considering the direct internal willing described in the model use of trying. However, it is inconceivable what one would do in order to try to perform movements of extra-bodily objects in this noninstrumental way.

6. (Section 2.) O’Shaughnessy is relying on a distinction between intensions and extensions. What is the difference? What is the intension of a word? What is the extension of a word? What would it be to hold the view that intensions determine extensions?

The intension of a word is a definition or description of the given term. The extension of a word is the set of all things that are included by the term. The difference here is that the intension is just a description that helps people to identify something that is in the set of all things that are within the given term. The intension may be found to be inadequate with time and research and may have to be updated from time to time. The extension however is the actual set of all things that are designated within the term, whether we realize it at the time or not. If we do not include something within a term but years later find out that it does happen to fall under the term it does not mean that only now it is in the extension. Rather it was in the extension the entire time, we just did not realize it based on the intension of the term at the time. If one holds the view that intensions determine extensions, the previous example would be different. In this case the thing that was found and not known to be in the set of the term would not be part of the extension because the intension at the time does not support it. In this case, an object is only in the extension if it can be identified by the intension that is used at a given time. For example, if a new species of cat is found that does not fall under the current intension of the term cat, then it will not be seen as part of the extension even if it actually should be.

7. Reconstruct and display perspicuously, premise by premise, the argument that is behind the volitionist linguistic reform (p. 75).

a)Actions are psychological phenomena
b)An essential mark of the mental (psychological phenomena) is that it is directed beyond itself
c)Thus, since action is entirely psychological/mental, it cannot have an object that is not given to the subject
d)Therefore if moving a limb causes another event which causes another event we cannot say that moving the limb was co-present in the external events since these external events were not of objects given to the subject
e)Consequently, the psychological event of limb moving cannot also include the external events caused by the limb moving
f)In this sense, moving the knob is not an act description as one did not move the knob since that was not a psychological event, but rather the act description lies in the psychological event of finger movement
g)Moving the knob can however be an act description if the will can reach beyond the body and directly activate the movement of the knob

8. What is nominalism (p. 82)?

Nominalism states that there is no one heading "action" that can include all the different types of action considered across the mental and physical. Arm-movings and trying-to-remembers differ greatly, and to classify them both as acts is to place two very different phenomena under the same category. Nothing about these phenomena forces us to lump them together as we do, but in the end it is just our decision to do so. Nominalism, however, realizes that there is a number of senses of action and that there is no one heading in which they all can fall under.

9. Explain and argue for the claim that “killings are necessarily instrumental, while only a few arm raisings are instrumental” (p 85).

No act-type is necessarily non-instrumental because anything we do can do non-instrumentally we can do instrumentally. For example, one can non-instrumentally raise one's arm by simply raising it. However, the act can also be carried out instrumentally by lifting it up using the other arm. Some act types, however, are necessarily instrumental because they cannot be carried out non-instrumentally. Any event that occurs through a non-instrumental limb movement exerting onto another object in order to carry out that event is instrumental. If one cannot carry out the event directly, then it is necessarily an instrumental act. For example, killing is necessarily instrumental because one cannot directly will a killing.

10. (A crucial discussion.) What does O’Shaughnessy say that your “just knowing” that Φ will occur is “opaque” but “explicable”?

A "just knowing" is opaque and explicable in cases such as just knowing that your arm will rise when you intend it to rise and you know that your arm is in full working order. What was just stated is essentially the explanation of the just knowing; however, it is opaque in that one intuitively knows that it will happen. One does not know it is going to happen from seeing it happen, such as knowing that the limb exists, but rather, just knows intuitively that it will happen when one intends it to and when the limb is in working order.

11. What does O’Shaughnessy mean by “aesthetic” in referring on page 102 to “the ordinary aesthetic situation”?

One definition of the word aesthetic refers to the pertaining to the senses. In this passage O'Shaughnessy is discussing what it would be like for someone to have absolutely no sensation in his arm and to still be able write a letter. Would this person know the posture of his limb or if it was flexed? Could the limb be amputated without him noticing? If the person truly had know sensation whatsoever in his limb, this should be the case. He then states that there is the possibility of the person just knowing, but this is far remove from the "ordinary aesthetic situation" which is to say the ordinary situation of pertaining to sensations as we understand them.

12. After all those other cases, where does O’Shaughnessy get off saying of his last case (the rubber hand) that it “suffers from the defect of being altogether too fantastic”? What’s the special problem with that case?

The major problem with this case is not that the rubber hand could not have the same look and feel of a normal hand, in fact the rubber hand can work well in this endeavor. The problem is that we have accumulated so much knowledge as to the true structure and function of the hand that we see this example of a rubber hand to be highly fantastical. Since the rubber hand can look and feel like a hand, we originally concede to the example, but as O'Shaughnessy states, this is misleading as he may have made it a hand of diamond or of water. The bottom line is that the example is miraculous especially as the hand is made of something other than flesh and blood since the explanation for movement is the muscles and nerves lacking in the rubber hand since the explanation for movement is the muscles and nerves lacking in the rubber hand.

Chapter 2 Study Questions

1. (§ 1) O’Shaughnessy says that he is inclined to say that there is an a priori limit to extending the will beyond the body, but he is not inclined to say that there is a logical limit to extending the will beyond the body. That seems to be a contradiction—but isn’t. Why not? What’s the difference?

When one states that "We cannot will the movement of extra-bodily entities", O'Shaughnessy sees this statement as one of misuse. It is not that the sentence lacks sense, he states, but that we cannot interpret whether is has a sense. This is an a priori limit rather than a logicial because the statement does not allow for one to understand what it means to will the movement of extra-bodily entities. If we cannot understand what it means to do this than we cannot understand whether there is a logical limit present or not.

2. (§ 2) In your own words, explain how a natural-kind term comes to be.

After a person or persons discover a natural-type thing needing a term, the discoverer(s) coin a term that can be used as a definite description. They must know what it is they are defining and which "what" it is. So long as it is singled out and employed in the future to mean that same what that the discoverers found, the term will be launched, and people are then commited to this term due to its initial use combined with its "designatum".

3. What is the difference between criteria for a term and “markers” (pointers) for its application?

The criteria for a term are the indepth real defining features of a natural-type thing. The markers are the more obviously seen indicators of a natural-type thing being of a certain term. For instance, when one sees a metal of a certain color, texture, and density, he or she will use these markers to categorize the metal as one kind or another. However, the criteria for a given term goes beyond the easily distinguished markers and explains what something truly is at its very core.

4. What are “contextual considerations” that play a role in determining the application of a natural-kind term?

Contextual considerations refer to the setting in which a natural-kind term was first established. O'Shaughnessy uses measles as an example. Since we established that term in the context of humans, we are reluctant to use the term when refering to animals. After a term is coined and is beginning to be applied more, people tend to use the given term in reference to things that are within the same contextual setting of the original usage.

5. (§ 3) What’s the difference between an injudicious use of a natural-kind term and its misuse? Your answer should explain why “sheer disregard of the epistemological ‘markers’ does not guarantee that one misuses a natural-kind term” (44).

An injudicious use of a natural-kind term occurs when one jumps the gun in determining what something is. This person has a correct understanding of what the term they use signifies and believe that what they have found is in fact that. This usage may be ill judged, but it is not misuse despite disregarding the epistemological markers since the user of the term understands and intends the meaning of the term. A misuse of a term is when the user of the term either does not properly understand the term or understands the term properly but uses it to refer to something that is not it fully aware of their mistake. In the former case the user may happen to use the term to refer to the correct thing, but does not understand what the term really means. This is still misuse because the user of the term did not intend for the given meaning. An example of the latter case is when one is drinking alcohol, but tells someone it is water in order to hide the truth. The user of the term water understands what water is, but misuses the term by refering to alcohol as water.

6. O’Shaughnessy gestures at two cases of misuse: “the case in which one mistakenly thinks one knows the meaning of a word and the case in which one uses a word to stand for what one thinks it does not designate … Agreement or not with fact is irrelevant” (43). Give your own examples of these two cases and explain why “agreement or not with fact is irrelevant.”

An example of the former case is when a child learns what a square is but goes on to call any four-sided shape a square. In this case, the child mistakenly thinks he or she knows the meaning of the word square. If the child identifies a four-sided shape that isn't a square as a square the misuse is easily seen. However, it is still a misuse when the child identifies the square as a square because the child does not understand what it is for a shape to be a square or why it is a square in this case and not in the others. It is by luck, not understanding and correct usage that the child is right. An example of the latter case would be a child finding his older brother's stash of cocaine. The older brother tells the child that it is a baggie of simple flour from the kitchen for a science experiment. In this case the older brother knows what flour is, but is using the term to stand for what he thinks and/or knows is cocaine. If he is right and it is cocaine, again the misuse is clear. However, it is still a misuse even if the powder turns out to be flour afterall and the older brother was tricked into buying it because as far as the brother knows it is cocaine, and he intended the misuse of the word.

7. (§ 4) What are the “markers” of physical action? (Again, what is a “marker”?) Which of these “markers” amounts to a “contextual requirement” and why? (Again, what is “contextual setting”?)

Markers of physical action include such things as a movement of a suitable part of an animal's body, intention and desire for the movement, and awareness that the subject has acted. Although these mainly seem like necessary features of physical actions, they can be considered markers of terms (indications that the object of a given term is present, in this case an arm rising is occuring when one uses the term arm rising) because without any indication of these markers one would not have knowledge of physical events. The contextual requirement is that the movement occur in a suitable part of the body (an arm rather than the hair). This contextual requirement limits the term physical action to disallow considerations of movements outside the body.

8. (§ 5) Does “the will can/cannot be extended beyond the body” have a sense? Explain.

It cannot be determined whether or not the statement "the will can/cannot be extended beyond the body” has a sense. This statement is a misuse of language in that it does not follow the contextual requirement of physical action. Since it is a misuse of language, we cannot understand the statement. Thus, we cannot truly determine the sense of the statement whether it has sense or not.

9. In your own words, what is “theory of meaning criticized by Putnam” (57)?

The theory of meaning Putnam criticizes is the assumption that we can determine what a natural-kind term encompasses by what we intend when we use the word. This is to say that since one has an internal concept of what a given term means, the extension of the term changes to fit the concept.

10. (page 58.) Go back to question 3.

We often think that we know the criteria for a term at any given time. However, new evidence may support different criteria for the same term. Criteria for a term is what is truly and deeply found in the depths of nature to be the defining features of a given natural-kind term. Markers, however, are what many consider criteria to be. This is the known features of the term. Markers are the characteristics seen that give someone a good idea that what they have found is of a given term. However, these markers may or may not end up being the correct criteria for the given term.